Employee Rights Short Takes: Age Discrimination Cases In The News

Posted on June 24, 2010 by Ellen Simon

Here are two Short Takes about some interesting age discrimination cases that made the news this month:

Forced Retirement At Age 70 Is Illegal

Nini v. Mercer County Community College: Rose Nini was a Dean at Mercer Community College from 1982 until 2005 when her contract expired and was not renewed. She was 73 years old at the time.

According to Nini, the college President, Dr. Robert Rose:

  • complimented her on her performance but “made it very clear to [her] that he thought [she] had no right to be working at [her] age”
  • said that employees of her age were considering retirement and suggested she should consider taking early retirement too
  •  told her that people who have been in a job for twenty-five years "lose their effectiveness." 
  • told her that it was her last chance to get an early retirement and leave with dignity.
  • held meetings with department heads in which he made jokes about getting rid of older employees
  • held meetings where several people discussed “age and incompetence and being dead wood”

Nini also stated that she heard from another employee that College Human Relations Director Vanessa Wilson said the College had to "get rid of old-timers and bring in new blood."

The lower court granted judgment in favor of the college holding that the college did not violate the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination because the statute allows an employer to refuse to renew an employment contract of an employee over seventy years of age. The Court of Appeals reversed and the the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion issued on June 1st holding that refusing to renew contracts for employees over the age of 70 because of their age violates the New Jersey’s age discrimination laws.

In other words, the failure to renew a contract because of age is equivalent to a termination -- not a failure to hire --according to the New Jersey Supreme Court. This case is good news for the many employees who are employed with contracts that are renewed year to year, or at the end of a certain term, particularly in states with statutory exceptions in discrimination laws similar to New Jersey’s.

Employees Replaced By Younger Individuals Can Prove Age Discrimination In Workforce Reduction Case

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tin, Inc.:  The EEOC announced last week that Tin, Inc., a manufacturing plant in Glendale, Arizona will pay $250,000 to settle a discrimination case filed by three employees who claimed they were fired because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.(ADEA).

The settlement follows a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in October that reversed summary judgment in favor of Tin and sent the case back to the district Court for trial.

According to the opinion, one of the plaintiffs, Neal, was replaced by an individual 15 years younger as plant manager. The EEOC provided evidence that Neal never received a negative performance review and in fact was told by his supervisors that they were satisfied with his performance.

The company contended that Neal’s younger replacement was better qualified because a facility he had run was profitable.

Interestingly, the Court stated that “the fact that a facility was profitable under one manager and not another does not mean that the two managers qualifications differed.” In addition, according to the Court, there was little evidence of the replacement's success at the plants in question. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Neal since material facts were in dispute.

The other two plaintiffs, McGraw and Vanecko, positions were terminated because their positions were eliminated according to Tin.  In order to establish an inference of discrimination in this type of case, the Court stated,  the plaintiff is entitled to show “that the employer had a continuing need for the employee’s skills and services in that his various duties were still being performed.”

The evidence showed that McGraw’s logistics manager duties were redistributed to the production manger and sales manager who were 20 and 23 years younger. It also showed that  Vanecko’ s plant controller duties were given to someone 24 years younger.

In addition, the EEOC presented evidence that the two supervisors with decision making authority over all three plaintiffs made comments from which a jury could find “that they harbored animus towards older workers.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the EEOC provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that age was the “but –for” cause of the terminations.

The opinion helps explain the kind of evidence that is useful in proving age discrimination in the often difficult cases of job elimination and workforce reduction.

Tags: , , , , , ,

Age Discrimination Gets Attention Of Congress

Posted on May 9, 2010 by Ellen Simon

Hearings Held On Federal Discrimination Bill To Overturn Gross Decision

Last week, both the House and Senate held hearings on the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA) (H.R. 3721, S. 1756). The legislation would overturn the awful Gross v. FBL Financials Services, Inc. case decided by the Supreme Court last year. If passed,  the bill will apply retroactively to all cases pending on or after June 17, 2009, the date of the Gross decision.

Simply stated, the Gross decision holds age discrimination plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof than other victims of discrimination by requiring them to prove that their age was the “but for” cause of the employer's adverse decision instead of  "a motivating factor." I predicted, as did others, that Gross would get a Congressional fix and that’s exactly what POWADA does – and more.

For one, POWADA allows the plaintiff to win an age discrimination case by proving that:

(A) an impermissible factor under the Act (the discrimination statute) was a motivating factor for the practice complained of  -- even if other factors also motivated the practice, or

(B) the practice complained of would not have occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.

The legislation also establishes that:

  • standards of proof for all federal laws forbidding discrimination and retaliation (including whistleblowing) are the same
  • the plaintiff can choose the method of proof for the case, including the McDonnell Douglas framework
  • employees can rely on any type or form of admissible circumstantial or direct evidence to prove their discrimination and retaliation cases

The Act explicitly states that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the standard of proof under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

In other words, all plaintiffs in discrimination cases will be held to the same standards of proof and will be able to prove their discrimination cases in the same way. While this is most certainly what Congress intended in the first place, it will be very beneficial for all of us who litigate these cases --- and our clients --- to have these evidentiary matters settled once and for all.

image: www.conversantlife.com/files/imagecache/blog_wizard/files/blog_wizard/proof.png

Tags: , , , , , , ,

Could This Be News? Employee Fired Because She Was Too Old And Too Expensive Has Right To Age Discrimination Trial

Posted on March 13, 2010 by Ellen Simon

Direct Evidence Of Age Discrimination Gets Plaintiff Jury Trial: Court Wrongfully Applied Mixed Motive Standard To Bounce The Case

It’s hard to believe that this age discrimination victim got thrown out of court and had to go to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a reversal but here’s what happened in the recently decided case of  Mora v. Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Facts Of The Case

Sixty-two year old Josephine Mora worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Hospital') as a fundraiser. She initially worked for someone named Chea who recommended to the Hospital’s chief executive, Rodriguez, that she be fired. The reasons for the recommendation are not set out in the opinion. 

Rodriguez first agreed, but then decided to give Mora a different position in his own office “where he could observe her more closely.” Mora worked with Rodriguez for a month. Rodriguez claimed during that time Mora was responsible for several errors and displayed a lack of professionalism.

At the end of the month, Rodriguez fired Mora. When he did so, according to Mora, Rodriguez called her into his office and said:

I need someone younger I can pay less … I need Elena [Quevedo, a 25 year old employee]

In addition, one employee heard Rodriguez tell Mora:

You are very old and inept. What you should be doing is taking care of old people. They really need you. I need somebody younger that I can pay less and I can control.

Another employee heard Rodriguez say, "she's too old to be working here anyway" in reference to Mora.

In the course of  Mora's lawsuit filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ("ADEA") Rodriguez denied making these discriminatory remarks. In addition, the Hospital argued that even if it did discriminate against Mora, she would have been fired anyway because of poor performance.

The district court agreed with the defendant, concluded that the Hospital had met its burden under the “same decision” affirmative defense, and granted judgment in favor of the Hospital. Mora appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit Reverses

Mixed Motive Analysis Wrongfully Applied

Part of the reason why the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision was because it found that the district court wrongfully applied a Title VII mixed motive analysis to an ADEA case.

The discussion involves a lot of complicated and tortured law, but here’s the simplest I can make it.

In the landmark Supreme Court case of  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins  decided in 1989, the evidence showed that the partners at Price Waterhouse made sexist remarks and engaged in gender stereotyping when they denied Ann Hopkins partnership in the firm. In other words, there was direct evidence of discrimination.

In its holding the Supreme Court set out a new standard which could be applied to cases with direct evidence of discrimination.  In sum, when a plaintiff shows that race or sex discrimination was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway (in the absence of the discriminatory motive.)

Since the Price Waterhouse decision, this kind of discrimination case is often referred to as a “mixed motive case” with a “same decision defense.”

In Moro’s case, the district court applied the Price Waterhouse mixed motive analysis and ruled that the Hospital proved its “same decision” defense. It  concluded that Mora ‘s termination was inevitable given the number and severity of her workplace problems and that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.  And so she lost as a matter of law.

The problem with the district court’s ruling -- according to the 11th Circuit -- is that the Supreme Court's decision in  Gross v. FBIS Financial Services (2009) held that the Price Waterhouse mixed motive burden shifting analysis only applied to discrimination claims brought under Title VII and did not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ( I wrote about the awful Gross case here and here)

Consequently, since the mixed motive burden shifting analysis was wrongly applied,  the defense was not entitled to its same decision defense, and the district court’s reliance on that defense in finding against the plaintiff  was reversible error.

The Jury Should Decide Whether Mora Was Fired Because Of Her Age

After the 11th Circuit explained why the district court’s analysis was wrong, it went on to explain what the correct analysis is – and unlike the above discussion, it’s all very straightforward from there.

A plaintiff in an ADEA case may prove illegal age discrimination with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Moro testified that she was fired because of her age, and two co-employees substantiated her. The Hospital denied that the comments were made which meant that material facts were in dispute and the case properly belonged in front of a jury.

As the Court put it:

The resolution of this case depends on whose account of the pertinent conversations a jury would credit. …..

A reasonable juror could find that Rodriguez’s statements should be taken at face value and that he fired Plaintiff because of her age. For us to conclude otherwise would be to deny Plaintiff the benefit of resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor as the nonmoving party.

Given the disputed question of material fact, Defendant was unentitled to a summary judgment.

Take Away

It’s awfully common for people to be let go because they are considered by some to be too old and too expensive. I can’t count the number of times I have represented people who were fired for just those reasons.

In this case,  Josephine Mora was told, “you’re too old. I need to find someone younger and cheaper.” If it’s not a case of age discrimination, I don’t know what is.

It’s both astounding and disheartening that forty three years after the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a court faced with such strong evidence of age discrimination could throw the plaintiff out, grant judgment in favor of the employer, and deprive the employee of her right to a jury trial

It’s a good thing the Eleventh Circuit fixed the mistake and published this opinion, because if this woman can't get her age discrimination case in front of a jury, I have a hard time figuring out who can.

image: lawblog.legalmatch.com
Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Congress Introduces Age Discrimination Bill To Fix Supreme Court's Gross Decision

Posted on October 16, 2009 by Ellen Simon

Age Discrimination Legislation Will Overturn Gross Decision

Last June, the Supreme Court issued the awful and controversial age discrimination opinion in the Gross v. FBL Financial Services case.

I wrote about the case at that time and predicted that it was just a matter of time until Congress fixed it with a bill that would overrule the decision and set the record straight on the fair standard of proof for age discrimination plaintiffs.

Last Tuesday, the Senate and House introduced legislation designed to do just that.

The bill -- introduced as H.R. 3721 -- and called the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimation Act, will put age discrimination plaintiffs back where they were before the Gross decision.

The bill will apply to all cases pending on or after June 17, 2009,  the day before the Gross decision.

Senator Patrick Leahy, one of the authors of the bill had this to say (as reported in the New York Times):

What our bill does is restore the intent of Congress, an intent that I believe the Supreme Court negligently ignored.

In Gross, the Court held that the Plaintiff, Jack Gross, was required to prove that age was the “but for” reason he was demoted from his job.

In other words, the plaintiff would have to prove that “but for" his age, he would not have been demoted (fired, hired, etc.).

Most interpret this as a new and more stringent requirement that age be the sole reason for the adverse employment action (though the case has conflicting language on that issue).

What's fundamentally flawed about the Court's interpretation of the federal age discrimination statute (ADEA) is that it's not consistent with all  of the other comparable civil rights statutes.

Simply stated, it makes no sense for an age discrimination plaintiff to be treated differently, and more harshly, than a plaintiff in a race or gender discrimination case. The method of proof and standard of proof has been, and ought to be, the same.

In other discrimination cases a plaintiff must prove that the alleged discrimination was "a motivating factor," not the  sole reason, for the challenged adverse employment decision.

This bill establishes that age discrimination cases are to be interpreted by the same "motivating factor" standard of proof.

The bill also explicitly recognizes the difficulty of proving discrimination cases and makes clear that victims of any kind of prohibited discrimination can prove their cases with direct or circumstantial evidence.

According to Senator Tom Harkin, one of the co-sponsors of the bill -- as reported in Workforce Management:

The Court invented a new standard that makes it prohibitively difficult for a victim to prove age discrimination

This extraordinarily high burden radically undermines older workers’ ability to hold employers accountable.

It’s no secret that workers over 55 have been hit hard by the recession. According to the EEOC, 25,000 age discrimination cases were filed last year, a 30%increase from 2000.

The last thing these folks need is a more difficult standard of proof when age discrimination is at play.

Fortunately, Congress has the final say on what its legislation means and how it should be interpreted. That’s why it gets to say that all discrimination plaintiffs should be treated consistently by the courts.

Let’s hope that this important Congressional fix gets passed soon.
 

image:blog.prospect.org   images1.wikia.nocookie.net

Tags: , , , , , , ,

Eighth Circuit Sets Record Straight On Age Discrimination

Posted on September 28, 2009 by Ellen Simon

Age Discrimination Plaintiff Gets Great Decision From Court of Appeals

It looks like a typical age discrimination scenario. A supervisor makes hostile remarks about older employees and expresses a preference for younger ones. An older employee with an excellent record gets fired for trumped-up reasons and a younger employee is hired to replace her.

What seems like an obvious case of age discrimination was not so obvious to the Federal District Court in the Western District of Missouri when it threw out the case of Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgt. Co. on summary judgment.

Fortunately, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed this month in an important opinion about the proper interpretation of evidence in an age discrimination case. 

What Happened In The Case

Kathy Baker worked as the director of assisted living at a center operated by Silver Oak since 2003. Her 2004 review was excellent in every category.

A few months later, Carolyn Thomas was hired as Baker’s new supervisor. After taking over, Thomas told Baker that:

  • Silver Oak needed people that were "young and vivacious, not slow and old"
  • Baker "needed to get rid of the dead wood"
  • Employees who had been fired were "slow and old"

She also told Baker that:

  • She dressed like an old lady
  • Everyone had to "keep up with" two supervisors who were in their thirties

The CEO, Eric Lindsey, made similar remarks at meetings attended by Baker.

Thomas also admitted that she teased Baker about walking slowly and having poor hearing. She also repeatedly asked Baker to fire and discipline older employees.

When Baker told Thomas that  "you can’t get rid of employees just because they’re old," Thomas responded that:

  • "firing older employees would allow Silver Oak to hire younger employees for less money'"
  • "younger employees would be better workers, have more energy, be more enthusiastic, and stimulate the residents"

After refusing Thomas’ demands to get rid of the older employees, Baker was disciplined and placed on indefinite probation.

The reason given was that Baker allegedly failed to get proper approval before admitting a special-needs resident and dismissed an employee without having an administrator present.

Baker claimed that that these allegations were false.

Following those events, Thomas gave Baker a negative performance evaluation and asked Baker whether she was going to quit. She said no.

A couple of months later, Baker went on an approved medical leave. She was called in at some point during her leave, told that she had been temporarily replaced and that she was being transferred to another city.

She was again asked if she wanted to quit and again she said no.

Shortly after that she was fired . The reason given was that she did not call in each day during her medical leave. Baker was 53 years old at the time.

Angela Thomas, age 30, temporarily took over Baker’s duties until a new director -- 22 year old Starr McGinnes --  was hired to replace Baker a couple of months later.

The Lawsuit

Baker filed a lawsuit claiming age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and under the Missouri Human Rights Act.

While it may seem hard to believe in the face of this record, the federal district court threw out the case and granted judgment in favor of Silver Oak on all claims stating that Baker:

  • failed to present any direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in her termination (a misinterpretation of the Gross decision)
  • offered no evidence that Silver Oak’s stated reasons for firing her were a pretext for age discrimination
  • did not engage in any protected activity which would support a retaliation claim

The Court Of Appeals Reverses

Baker appealed the incomprehensible ruling of the district court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on all counts and gave Baker her day in court.

Here's the gist of what the Court had to say.

Evidence of Age Bias

Statements by Lindsey ( CEO) and Thomas (supervisor) -- who participated in the decision to fire Baker -- were evidence of a preference for younger workers over those protected by the ADEA.

As stated by the Court:

Lindsey’s statement to his management team that Silver Oak was ‘missing the boat by not hiring younger, vibrant people,’ and that employees ‘should start looking over applications better and try to consider hiring younger people’ is evidence that a reasonable jury could take to reflect a discriminatory attitude by one who participated in Baker’s termination.

Other evidence that the Court considered to support Baker’s age discrimination claim included:

  • Thomas’ criticism of Baker for dressing like an old lady
  • Thomas' comments about keeping up with younger employees
  • Baker’s refusal of Thomas’ directions to discipline older workers
Evidence of Pretext

The Court also found that Baker presented plenty evidence of pretext -- meaning that the reasons given for the discharge were not believable. Evidence of pretext can give rise to an inference of age discrimination and can be proved circumstantially.  "Direct evidence" is not essential.

In this case, that evidence of pretext included:

  • Baker’s explanation for why the probation was not warranted
  • Silver Oaks’ failure to follow its normal progressive discipline policy
  • Shifting explanations for why Baker was terminated:

As the Court stated:

Not every supplement to an employer’s initial statement of the reasons gives rise to an inference of pretext, but substantial variations raise suspicion.

[The evidence of pretext] is combined with evidence from which a jury could find that the management of Silver Oak harbored a discriminatory attitude toward older employees and desired to displace them in favor of a younger workforce.

Viewing all of the evidence together, we conclude that Baker has presented a submissible case of age discrimination under the ADEA.

Retaliation Claim Survives

Baker claimed that she was retaliated against because she opposed Silver Oak’s conduct which she believed to be unlawful age discrimination.

Baker filed an affidavit in which she stated that she repeatedly told Thomas:

  • That terminating older employees was wrong
  • You can’t get rid of employees just because they’re old

It’s a technical argument but in sum, the district court ignored the evidence because it was presented in an affidavit and not in Baker’s deposition or other court pleadings.

The Eighth Circuit held that the district court made an error in striking Baker’s affidavit and allowed Baker’s retaliation claim to proceed.

What’s Important About This Case

Everything but here’s the big three:

1.The case gives excellent illustrations about the kind of evidence from which a jury may infer age discrimination -- including hostility towards older workers and/or a preference for younger ones.

2. On the subject of pretext the Court makes note of a failure to follow normal progressive discipline policies, and shifting explanations for the discharge.

This kind of evidence is quite common in discrimination cases, and it’s very helpful for employees to have a Circuit Court of Appeals affirm it as proof of pretext.

3. While it’s a technical point, mostly for the lawyers, it’s extremely helpful that the lower court was reversed because it struck Baker’s affidavit.

Clients don’t always remember everything important about their case when interrogated in a lengthy deposition. Many times salient points are not ever asked.

Consequently, adding important evidence to the record by way of a sworn affidavit is often necessary to fill in the evidentiary gaps. The Eighth Circuit recognized this necessary practice and affirmed its propriety.

It’s really good news for plaintiffs in discrimination cases and their lawyers.

All in all, it’s just a great case for employees who are unfortunate victims of age discrimination. It should  also be instructive to employers as to what illegal age discrimination can look like in front of a jury.

image:therawfeed.com
Tags: , , , , , ,

Are Fox and American Idol Guilty of Age Discrimination?

Posted on April 20, 2009 by Ellen Simon

 It would have been hard to miss the heartwarming story last week about Susan Boyle’s performance on the British version of American Idol called Britain's Got Talent. The New York Times and CBS News  have extensively covered it as have most of the other media outlets.

The episode, according to the Times, has provoked a debate about the "not so young and not so beautiful" that has many people talking.

Here’s how one blogger, Letty Cottin Pogrebin, described  what happened on the show in her excellent piece in The Huffington Post:

Once on stage, her interrogator, Simon Cowell, asks about her dream. To be a professional singer, she says, and as successful as Elaine Page -- a statement that elicits great hilarity and hyperactive camera close-ups of the judges' bemused disbelief and the snickering, eye-rolling audience.  . . .

Cheerful and unperturbed, the contestant blithely announces that she is going to sing, "I Dreamed a Dream" from Les Miserables.

"How old are you, Susan?" asks Simon, in a tone more appropriate to an interview with a toddler.

"Forty-seven," she says. The audience cracks up. Pixels of ridicule fill the screen, incredulity, patronizing sneers, smirks, whispers you can almost hear: Look at her, will you! Frumpy from the Fifties, got a double chin, a silly Scottish accent, hails from some tiny hamlet, can't remember the word "villages," and to top it off, Omigod, she's old! Either she's a ringer and we're in for some weird parody of Dame Edna or we're about to see this dowdy dame make a fool of herself on the hottest show on British telly.

Finally, Susan Boyle steps into the spotlight and opens her mouth, and before she's sung three glorious, crystal clear notes, the audience is cheering, the judges' jaws have dropped, and I'm choking back tears.

It is truly a great story and if you have not seen the video, I strongly suggest that you join the thirty million people who have. It will surely bring a tear to your eye.

But here's what struck me when I first saw the story:  How come she gets to try out  and she's 47? Not so in the U.S.A.

While most people may not have given it much thought, it's pretty obvious that all of the singers on American Idol seem quite young  Well they are, and it's no coincidence

My husband  is a pretty good singer (for sure I have a bit of a bias) and we have a good time at karaoke clubs.  My son is an agent in the entertainment business.  I  mentioned to my son that I thought it would be fun if my husband tried out for American Idol -- not that he would win of course, but that it would be fun to go to a tryout. After he stopped laughing he said:

He can't try out

Why not?  I said. 

Because he's not under 30.

Yes, that's right.  In order  to try out for American Idol  you have to be under thirty years of age.  I checked the rules and here's what I found:


You have to be a legal U.S Citizen or a permanent U.S resident. You also have to be between the ages of 16 and 29. Make sure to bring 2 forms of I.D with you, at least one form must be a photo I.D. If you are under 18 you need to have a parent or legal guardian with you.

So is it age discrimination? It's not a real simple answer.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older from employment discrimination based on age. The ADEA applies to:

  • all employees and job applicants.
  • all terms and  conditions of employment including: hiring, firing, promotion, layoff, compensation, benefits, job assignments, and training.

It is crystal clear that an employer can not lawfully have a rule which prohibits it from employing anyone over the age of 30.

There are times when employers can lawfully use age in making employment decisions.  For example,commercial airline pilots are required to retire at a certain age. It's simply not safe to have 80 year old pilots flying commercial jet planes with hundreds of  lives at risk. 

For that logical reason, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act permits exceptions for:

a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par­ticu­lar business

That provision, commonly called the "BFOQ" exception, allows airlines as well as other industries (where safety, for example, may be an issue) to require retirement at a designated age.

But singing?  What could possibly be the bona fide occupational justification for statinging that an excellent singer has to be under 30?  Paul McCartney and Barbara Streisand still sound just fine. In fact, it seems to me that many singers get better with age.

The problem with this scenario is that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits age discrimination in employment and folks on American Idol are not applying for jobs, so the the act arguably does not apply.

I am not, however, completely convinced that's the end of the story and this is why.

American Idol is broadcast by Fox. Fox Broadcasting Company is a network that is heavily regulated by the federal government.

In fact , Fox is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to do business and is subject to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992  as well as a host of other federal laws.Television networks have all sorts of civil rights compliance requirements and regulations which prohibit discrimination.

While I understand that this is not a case of discrimination in employment, it certainly seems to me that it may be a case of discrimination in the award of a contract.

This is my argument:

  • when you win American Idol you get a recording contract
  • the contract is offered on to those under 30
  • Fox Broadcasting, through American Idol, is committing age discrimination in the award of contracts by not allowing those over 30 to compete.

I am not entirely sure whether the argument is constitutionally sound, but I am not convinced that it's not.

As a constitutional matter, if a governmental entity awarded contracts to whites only,  we would no doubt be outraged. The government would have the impossible burden of showing that it had a "compelling governmental purpose" for doing so and the alleged justification would be given "strict scrutiny". In other words, we would have little trouble proving that the contract is unconstitutional and illegal.

But even at the lower level of constitutional scrutiny used in cases of gender or age discrimination, how could  a contract awarded only to singers under the age of 30 be "rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose" ? ( if Fox is considered to be taking governmental action because of it's federal license or because it is heavily regulated by the federal government a constitutional analysis could kick in)

Yes, it's all quite complicated.  Constitutional law is not easy. But it's not hard to ask this question: If American Idol only permitted white individuals to audition, or permitted only men to try out, how would we feel about it and what would we do?

Putting all of the legal complexities aside, from one Simon to another, I feel compelled to ask: why can't the show let everyone try out  to be the next American Idol?

Equal opportunity in England, but not the United States, just doesn't seem right.

image: weblogs.newsday.com
Tags: , , , , , ,

Supreme Court Surprise

Posted on February 7, 2009 by Ellen Simon

 This post was originally published in Today's Workplace www.workplacefairness.org on September 10, 2008

Three years ago, I was interviewed by Court TV about the John Roberts nomination. In preparation, I painstakingly reviewed his record. In so doing, I reached the unpleasant conclusion that Roberts was philosophically opposed to civil rights and other legislation for the public good which Roberts deemed to an improper exercise of congressional power.

 The Roberts point of view, it seemed to me, was that since Congress should not have authored this legislation to begin with, it must be as narrowly construed as possible. This was the only logic I could discern which connected a long record of what appeared to be outright hostility to plaintiffs in civil rights cases.

 I was extremely worried about what might happen with Roberts at the helm of the Court. The Alito nomination, with a record equally as hostile to plaintiffs in civil rights cases as that of Roberts, made me feel even more concerned. The harsh reality of Thomas and Scalia combing with these forces was a truly frightening prospect.

But the fact remains; we never really know with any precision what one will do after ascension to the Supreme Court actually occurs. Nothing surprised me more than the Court’s decision this past year in the decision of Sprint v Mendelsohn 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) – and it was a very pleasant surprise indeed. 

Civil rights cases are hard to prove. There is seldom direct evidence of discrimination. People don’t go around saying, “we’re not going to hire you because you’re black,” or “we’re firing you because you’re old.” More often than not, we have to prove our cases by circumstantial evidence. Part of that evidence is proving that the reason give by the employer’s decision to fire, or not hire, is not true or not believable.

Other circumstantial evidence routinely offered is that the same thing or something similar happened to co-employees. The admissibility of this kind of evidence, labeled by the defense bar as “me too evidence” has been a battleground since we started trying to prove these cases over a quarter century ago.

Lawyers who represent employees want to call other employees as witnesses to testify about the discrimination that happened to them at the same company. Simply put, these lawyers contend that co-employee testimony is circumstantial evidence that this company discriminated in this particular case because it did the same thing to other employees. In their view, the jury ought to be able to consider this evidence and give it whatever weight they choose in making the ultimate determination as to whether the plaintiff was discriminated against or not.   Lawyers who represent companies don’t want those witnesses to take the stand. They say that what happened to others is not relevant, proves nothing, is confusing and prejudicial, and will result in a bunch of mini-trials about other people who are not parties to the case. 

Some courts have let the evidence in. Some courts have barred it. The significance of this kind of ruling can not be overstated since one’s ability to put on co-employee testimony before a jury can make the difference as to whether the case will be won or lost. For example, where a story about why one thirty year employee got terminated may seem plausible in isolation, it certainly seems less plausible when there are five or six other long term employees whose performance was suddenly not good enough for a company where each has worked without incident for twenty or thirty years. 

Ellen Mendelsohn was terminated in a reduction of the workforce by Sprint, a company where she had worked for many years. She claimed age discrimination. Mendelsohn’s lawyer attempted to introduce evidence from five other older workers who also claimed they were discriminated against because of their age when they were terminated. Three of the five were prepared to testify about denigrating remarks made about older workers. Another claimed that he was banned from working at Sprint because of his age. One was going to testify that he was required to get permission before hiring anyone over the age of forty. None were in the same department as Mendelsohn. The judge ruled the evidence inadmissible because there was no shared decision maker and no temporal proximity. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the evidence was admissible.

The Supreme Court accepted the case. In a decision which has a profound effect on the future of employment discrimination cases, the Court held that the trial court judge was wrong. The unanimous decision, shockingly authored by Justice Thomas, stated that a blanket rule of law excluding evidence of discrimination from co-workers in a discrimination case was wrong as a matter of law. The Court relied in its opinion on the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to relevance, admissibility, and prejudice which vests the trial court with broad discretion on these matters.  The trial court should determine whether the evidence has probative value and whether sufficient prejudice or confusion may outweigh it. It is a fundamental and liberal standard of evidence which leans toward the admission of evidence given the proper context and foundation.

 So while the decision did not endorse the 10th’Circuit’s view in concluding that the evidence was admissible, the opinion is earth shattering in the world of employment law for what it didn’t say – that is, that the evidence was not per se inadmissible.    In other words, the Court ruled, “me too evidence” should be treated just like any other evidence in any other case.

It may seem odd that it took a pronouncement of the Supreme Court to let judges and lawyers know that the same rules that apply to evidence in all civil cases also apply in discrimination cases. But in the tortured history of discrimination litigation, the same rules unfortunately have not been applied (i.e. the granting of summary judgment where material facts are in dispute, the improper weighing of evidence by the court instead of the jury)

 An opinion by the Supreme Court which held the evidence inadmissible would have been a huge blow to employees faced with the already formidable task of proving that discrimination has occurred. Fortunately, the Supreme Court in an exceedingly pleasant surprise made an important inroad just by reciting and reinforcing the rules of evidence and thereby neutralizing the playing field.

image: http://www.biojobblog.com/surprise(1).jpg
Tags: , , , , , , , ,